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Abstract
This paper provides a critique of alternative organizational structures in the hedge fund industry. Our critique is 
facilitated by several stylized models describing alternative industry structures. The models include: (1) An inside-
only hedge fund model; (2) A straddling hedge fund model; (3) A straddling “feeder” fund of funds (FOF) hedge 
fund model; (4) A stand-alone outside hedge fund; and (5) An outside “feeder” FOF hedge fund model. Our 
discussion of these models, which centers on benefits vs. fundamental problems related to illiquidity, information 
asymmetry, and conflicts of interest, leads to several hypotheses about the differential characteristics and return 
performance of both individual hedge funds and FOFs. 
Keywords: Hedge funds, Funds of funds, Illiquidity, Information asymmetry, Conflicts of interest, Adjacency risk,
Contagion, Return performance.
1. INTRODUCTION
Over the past 20 years, the hedge fund industry has experienced a tremendous boom-and-bust cycle. 
Regarding the boom, Stulz (2007) reports that: “In 1990, less than $50 billion was invested in hedge 
funds; in 2006, more than $1 trillion was invested in hedge funds” (p. 176). Citi (2010) reports that from 
2000-2003, assets under management (AUM) increased 67.1%, from $490.6 billion to $820.0 billion, 
and increased an additional 135% to $1.93 trillion in the second quarter of 2008, when AUM peaked. 
Thereafter, however, the financial crisis took a heavy toll on AUM, as the industry experienced outflows 
of $151.7 billion and $103.3 billion in the fourth quarter of 2008 and first quarter of 2009, respectively. 20
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Over time, one particular class of funds, namely funds of hedge funds (FOFs), steadily represented 
about a third of the industry.
Citi argues that the hedge fund industry grew after 2000 largely because of institutional investors’
disillusionment following the busting of the 'dot-com' bubble: “As the technology boom of the late 1990s 
faded and market turmoil set in during the early 2000s, institutional investors’ allocations to long-only 
equities  and  bonds  failed  to  generate  the  returns  many  sought.  As  their  liability  gaps  increased, 
institutional investors began to broaden their investment horizon and look increasingly at alternatives”
(p. 12). Specifically, hedge funds held out the promise of positive performance regardless of market 
returns. However, if hedge funds can fulfill this promise, the trillion dollar question is: Why did the 
industry experience outflows rather than inflows during the turmoil of the latest financial crisis?
In this paper, we attempt to address this question through a critique of structures that have evolved in 
the  hedge  fund  industry,  particularly  post-2000,  and  specifically,  Funds  of  Funds.  Our  critique  is 
facilitated by several stylized models describing alternative structures in the industry. The models are: 
(1) An inside-only hedge fund model; (2) A straddling hedge fund model; (3) A straddling “feeder” fund 
of funds (FOF) hedge fund model; (4) A stand-alone hedge fund model; and (5) An outside “feeder”
FOF  hedge  fund  model.  Our  discussion  of  these  models,  which  centers  on  advantages  versus 
fundamental  problems, leads  to  several hypotheses about the  organizational structure, operational 
structure, risk, and return performance of both individual hedge funds and FOFs. We test as many of 
these  hypotheses  as  data  availability  allows,  and  evidence  is  generally  consistent  with  these 
hypotheses. We discuss FOFs from two distinct perspectives. First, an investor’s perspective includes 
whether FOFs offer attractive features relative to regular hedge funds, or whether they outperform. In 
this respect, regarding characteristics, we predict that some hedge funds and FOFs will have greater 
leverage and/or more restrictive withdrawal policies than others. Regarding return performance, we 
predict that certain hedge funds, and FOFs in general, will have relatively poor return performance. 
Second, we analyze the role that FOFs play in the industry. Specifically, we ask whether FOFs “help”
the funds in which they invest, or the industry in general, and we find that they do not. Finally, we 
discuss  current trends in the  industry  that  also appear to bear  out  our  hypotheses. The  paper  is 
organized as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the literature related to hedge funds. In Section 3, 
we present and discuss several stylized structural models of the hedge fund industry, and specify 
several testable hypotheses. Section 4 describes the data that we use in our empirical analysis. In 
Section 5 we present and discuss results of empirical tests of our hypotheses. In Section 6 we discuss 
current trends in the hedge fund industry that relate to our hypotheses. Finally, Section 7 summarizes.Cao Y., Ogden J. P. and Tiu C. I.
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In this section, we briefly review the extant literature related to hedge funds. Fung and Hsieh (1999) and 
Stulz (2007) provide excellent general descriptions of hedge funds’ legal and organizational structures, 
so we do not repeat this discussion here, except to state that: (a) hedge funds are formed as private 
limited partnerships; (b) investment is restricted to high net-worth individuals or institutional investors; 
and (c) hedge fund managers typically receive compensation in the form of a fixed fee (e.g., 2% of 
AUM) and an asymmetric performance fee (e.g., 20% of fund returns above a hurdle rate (e.g., the risk-
free rate)), while the typical compensation for the manager of a FOF includes a fixed fee of 1% and an 
asymmetric performance fee of 10%. Both types of managers are generally subject to a “high-water 
mark” restriction.
Instead, we review literature directly related to issues addressed in this paper, including illiquidity, 
opacity,  conflicts  of  interest,  leverage,  and  performance.  As  this  review  reveals,  these  issues  are 
addressed in piecemeal fashion across articles in the extant literature. The objective of our modeling 
effort in Section 3 is to address, in an integrated fashion, not only these issues but others that have 
received little attention in the literature.
2.1. Information asymmetry (or opacity)
The information asymmetry or opacity problem may be the most serious problem that besets the hedge 
fund  industry.  Hedge  funds  lack  transparency  because  each  hedge  fund's  investment  strategy  is 
proprietary, so managers are loathe to reveal details about their strategy and operations to anyone, 
including current and prospective investors. They are private, rather than public, in order to avoid SEC 
requirements for filing audited financial statements (though some hedge funds do so). Hedge funds' 
reporting is essentially limited to a broad statement about investment strategy and periodic reports of 
fund returns. As a result, the entire hedge fund industry is potentially subject to the lemons problem 
associated  with  information  asymmetry  as  in  Akerlof  (1970).  Consequences  of  this  problem  have 
received considerable attention in the literature, though analyses focus more on implications of the 
problem and less on mechanisms to mitigate the problem.
Bollen and Pool (2009) use statistical analysis to determine whether hedge fund managers fully report 
gains but delay reporting losses in order to reduce the risk of capital flight. They suggest that their 
conditional serial correlation measure is a leading indicator of fraud. Bollen and Pool (2009) find “... a 
significant discontinuity in the pooled distribution of monthly hedge fund returns: the number of small 
gains far exceeds the number of small losses. The discontinuity is present in live and defunct funds, and 22
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funds of all ages, suggesting it is not caused by database biases. The discontinuity is absent in the 
three months culminating in an audit, suggesting it is not attributable to skillful loss avoidance. The 
discontinuity  disappears  when  using  bimonthly  returns,  indicating  a  reversal  in  fund  performance 
following small gains. This result suggests the discontinuity is caused at least in part by temporarily 
overstated returns” (Abstract). Brown, Goetzmann, Liang, and Schwarz (2008) examine SEC filings by 
hedge funds during a temporary period (February 2006) when SEC mandated filings (via Form ADV) 
were  made  (i.e.,  before  a  court  overturned  the  mandate).  Among  other  findings,  they  document: 
“... evidence that the information in the form has the potential to add value to the investor decision-
making  process.  Hedge  funds  operated  by  managers  filing  Form  ADV  in  2006  had  better  past 
performance and had more assets than those operated by managers who did not file either because 
they were technically exempt from the filing requirement, or because they simply chose not to file. This 
result suggests that filing alone may be a potential signal of quality. In addition, we find a strong positive 
association between potential conflicts identified in the Form ADV filing and past legal and regulatory 
problems. Finally, through a canonical correlation analysis, we are able to establish a link between 
potential conflicts identified in Form ADV filings and operational risk characteristics in the Lipper TASS, 
Inc. (TASS) database” (p. 2787). Brown, Goetzmann, Liang, and Schwarz (2010) summarize the results 
of their analysis of hedge fund due diligence (DD) reports as follows: “In this paper we study a sample of 
444 due diligence (DD) reports from a major hedge fund DD firm, many of which indicate a lack of 
transparency about past legal and regulatory problems, failure to use a major auditing firm and the use 
of internal pricing ...  This study uses evidence of inadequate or failed internal processes to derive a 
simple and direct measure of operational risk ... Exposure to this risk increases the likelihood of 
subsequent poor performance. Since these DD reports are performed after positive performance it is 
important to control for potential bias due to this and other conditioning factors. Although our sample is 
not sufficiently large to determine  whether this is a priced source  of risk, it does not appear that 
exposure to operational risk influences in any way the tendency of hedge fund investors to invest on the 
basis of past high returns. Our study emphasizes the importance of information verification in the 
context of financial intermediation”(Abstract).
Finally, Stulz (2007) suggests that the relative growth of FOFs over time may be due to their role in 
mitigating  opacity  problems,  among  other  roles:  “A  fund-of-funds  is  a  hedge  fund  that  invests  in 
individual  hedge  funds  and  monitors  these  investments,  thereby  providing  investors  a  diversified 
portfolio of hedge funds, risk management services, and a way to share the due diligence costs with 
other investors” (p. 180). So again, FOFs seem to hold promise as a positive development in the 
industry. In Section 3, we suggest an alternative motive for the development of some FOFs, particularly Cao Y., Ogden J. P. and Tiu C. I.
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those developed by investment banks for their own funds. We also suggest a dark side to other FOFs: 
They  may  steer  investors  toward  hedge  funds  that  are  relative  lemons.  We  find  support  for  this 
hypothesis.
2.2. Illiquidity
A hedge fund is created to exploit the talents of its managers to identify arbitrage opportunities that arise 
in a given security market due to temporary mispricing. Finance theory suggests that such opportunities 
are more likely to emerge, and to be larger, in securities that are relatively illiquid (e.g., small-firm 
stocks).  As  a  general  consequence,  though,  a  considerable  amount  of  time  is  required  for  these 
arbitrage strategies to yield profits. Thus, investment in a hedge fund itself is necessarily relatively 
illiquid. Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004) and others document that hedge fund returns exhibit 
considerable 'exposure' to illiquidity.
To deal with illiquidity exposure, hedge funds generally impose two types of exit restrictions on its 
investors. First, a new investor is subject to an initial lock-up period during which the investor cannot 
withdraw their investment. Second, a seasoned investor must give redemption notice before they can 
withdraw their funds, and the filing of such a notice is often available only during certain time windows 
throughout the year. Exit restrictions vary considerably across hedge funds. Aragon (2007) documents 
evidence  that  average  returns  are  higher  for  hedge  funds  that  are  more  withdrawal  restricted, 
suggesting that hedge fund returns in effect contain an 'illiquidity' premium. Similarly, Sadka (2010) finds 
that “liquidity risk as measured by the covariation of fund returns with unexpected changes in aggregate 
liquidity is an important determinant in the cross-section of hedge-fund returns. The results show that 
funds that significantly load on liquidity risk subsequently outperform low-loading funds by about 6% 
annually,  on  average,  over  the  period  1994-2008,  while  negative  performance  is  observed  during 
liquidity crises” (p. 54). Also, Khandani and Lo (2009) find that the hedge fund returns are correlated 
with returns on illiquid assets (See also Longstaff (2001); Kahl, Liu, and Longstaff (2003); Lerner and 
Schoar (2004)). Of course, the flip side of this discussion is that hedge funds improve the liquidity of the 
markets in which they invest. Brophy, Ouimet, and Sialm (2009) document evidence consistent with this 
argument (See also Ben-David, Franzoni, and Moussawi (2010)).
Finally, it is conceivable that funds of hedge funds (FOFs) could serve to ease the illiquidity problem in 
the  hedge  fund  industry.  Specifically,  a  FOF  could  (a)  spread  investor  redemptions  across  the 
numerous hedge funds in which it invests, or (b) identify specific hedge funds within its portfolio that are 
more amenable to redemptions at a given point in time. Indeed, such a redemptions distributing service 
could be a major reason for the existence of FOFs. Instead, researchers have focused on other reasons 24
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for the existence of FOFs, as we discuss below. Thus, we test the redemptions distributing hypothesis 
by comparing the redemption-restriction terms of FOFs with those of stand-alone hedge funds. If the 
argument has merit, FOFs should be observed offering better redemption terms than stand-alone hedge 
funds. However, our modeling discussion in Section 3 leads us to be skeptical about the realization of 
this redemptions distributing service, at least for some FOFs. Indeed, we shall document that in the 
recent period, the FOFs do not offer better share redemptions than individual hedge funds.
2.3. Leverage
An under-investigated research question is why many hedge funds employ substantial leverage. The 
importance of the leverage question is underscored by the spectacular failures of hedge funds Long-
Term Capital Management (LTCM) and Amaranth, both of which were highly levered. In a recent paper, 
Titman (2010) addresses the issue of hedge fund leverage:
“ ... the leverage of investment funds, such as hedge funds, is not well understood. Many of the 
issues that relate to the leverage of hedge funds and the leverage of corporations are similar. In 
particular, in the event of a negative shock, the overly levered hedge fund, like an overly levered 
corporation, may be forced to close out illiquid positions at unfavorable costs. These costs received 
substantial attention in the popular press, both around the LTCM crisis in 1998 and during the more 
recent episode in 2008. However, the advantages of leverage for hedge funds are much less 
understood. Indeed, there are no tax advantages. Although issues of hedge fund leverage have 
attracted  considerable  attention  from  regulators  and  the  popular  press,  academics  have  not 
seriously  examined  why  hedge  funds  tend  to  be  so  highly  levered.  Despite  the  obvious 
disadvantages  of  leverage,  hedge funds  are  often  substantially  more  levered  than  typical 
corporations. Indeed, according to the Lipper TASS data base there are a number of convertible 
arbitrage funds that have leverage ratios that exceed five to one. And while the measurement of 
hedge fund leverage is itself a challenge, given the alternative avenues available to hedge funds for 
levering their investments, e.g., debt and derivatives, there seems to be substantial cross-sectional 
and time series variation in the use of leverage by hedge funds. The question that I will raise in this 
note is whether there is a fundamental (i.e., fully rational) explanation of the substantial use of 
leverage by hedge funds. Or do hedge funds simply use leverage to inflate returns in good times to 
fool or in other ways exploit nave clients?”(pp. 2-3).
Although Titman arrives at no definitive conclusions on the issue, he suggests several potential market 
imperfections that may explain hedge funds’ use of leverage. For instance, hedge funds may use 
leverage on a contingent 'line-of-credit' basis to inject capital that offsets redemptions following poor Cao Y., Ogden J. P. and Tiu C. I.
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performance. Alternatively, leverage “can arise from the convexity of the direct compensation of hedge 
funds as well as the indirect incentives that come from the hedge funds’ inflows and outflows. Convex 
payoffs generate an incentive to increase leverage and in other ways increase risk” (p. 7). We discuss 
hedge funds’ use of leverage within our modeling analysis in Section 3. We arrive at a hypothesis that is 
actually close to Titman’s early quip that hedge funds may use leverage to “inflate returns in good times 
to fool or in other ways exploit nave clients”, although our hypothesis predicts that only a subset of 
lemon hedge funds use leverage for this purpose. Due to unavailability on dynamic data on leverage we 
were unable to test these hypotheses.
2.4. Performance
The price performance of hedge funds is easily the most widely researched issue. Overall, the evidence 
regarding whether hedge funds provide superior return performance is mixed. In attempting to assess 
performance, researchers have had to deal with two major problems, (a) developing an appropriate 
benchmark for judging performance; and (b) dealing with survivorship bias in the data (See Fung and 
Hsieh (1997); Lo (2005)).
Ackermann, McEnally, and Ravenscraft (1999) conducted one of the earliest empirical analyses of 
hedge fund performance. They summarize their results as follows: “Using a large sample of hedge fund 
data from 1988-1995, we find that hedge funds consistently outperform mutual funds, but not standard 
market indices. Hedge funds, however, are more volatile than both mutual funds and market indices. 
Incentive fees explain some of the higher performance, but not the increased total risk. The impact of 
six data-conditioning biases is explored. We find evidence that positive and negative survival-related 
biases offset each other” (p. 833). In contrast, Grecu, Malkiel, and Saha (2007) find that managers of 
poorly performing funds more likely to fail to report results. Liang (2000) also questions the findings of 
Ackermann, McEnally, and Ravenscraft (1999) after finding survivorship bias of over 2% per year (See 
also Amin and Kat (2003)). Liang (2001) corrects for survivorship bias and finds that HFs have a higher 
Sharpe ratio than the S& P 500, 0.41 to 0.27, based on data for the years 1990-1999. Both Xiong, 
Idzorek, Chen, and Ibbotson (2009) and Fung, Hsieh, Naik, and Ramadorai (2008) find that hedge 
funds generate positive abnormal returns. Edwards and Caglayan (2010) also find evidence of hedge 
fund outperformance, as well as performance persistence for up to two years (See also Agarwal and 
Naik (2000); Kosowski, Naik, and Teo (2007)).
In  contrast, several studies document  evidence  that hedge  funds  are unable to generate superior 
returns. Asness, Krail, and Liew (2001) find that, after accounting for stale pricing in illiquid securities, 
hedge  funds  do not  provide  superior  returns. Fung  and  Hsieh (2004) find  that  global hedge  fund 26
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managers are unable to provide superior performance after adjusting for illiquidity effects, nonlinearity, 
and survivorship bias. Malkiel and Saha’s (2005) analysis suggests that much of the reported superior 
performance of hedge funds is due to survivorship bias which, they estimate, adds up to 4.5% per year 
to hedge fund returns.
Finally, several researchers have analyzed the performance of FOFs. Ang, Rhodes-Kropf, and Zhao 
(2008) argue that because they offer diversification that investors cannot achieve on their own, FOFs 
are uniquely desirable investments. Agarwal and Kale (2007) argue that FOFs and multi-strategy hedge 
funds are similarly diversified, yet the multi-strategy hedge funds outperform FOFs even on a gross-of-
fees basis. Fung, Hsieh, Naik, and Ramadorai (2008) find that FOFs deliver abnormal returns only for a 
brief period, and that mostly they underperform.
3. FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS WITH HEDGE FUNDS AND CRITIQUES OF ALTERNATIVE 
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES
To investors, the advantage of the hedge fund structure over mutual funds is that hedge funds have 
greater flexibility in seeking abnormal returns, or alpha. A hedge fund can take positions in the market 
that  mutual funds cannot, including short  positions, levered  positions,  and positions in  derivatives. 
Moreover, hedge fund managers’ contracts provide them with a strong incentive to create alpha, while 
mutual funds’ contracts are more restrictive.
Against these and other advantages, however, there are many fundamental problems with hedge funds. 
In this section, we initially discuss these fundamental problems. We then describe several alternative 
organizational structures in the hedge fund industry to determine the extent to which each is subject to 
these fundamental problems.
3.1. A review of fundamental problems associated with hedge funds
Here we briefly discuss several fundamental problems associated with at least some hedge funds. 
Though all of these problems may be interrelated, some problems are more obviously related to each 
other, so we group the problems into three clusters.
3.1.1. Problem cluster 1: opacity
As discussed in Section 2, the opacity of hedge funds gives rise to two fundamental problems: (a) the 
lemons problem; and (b) the potential for fraud. Regarding the lemons problem, if investors lack the 
information necessary  to  distinguish  hedge funds  with  genuine  ability  to  generate  alpha,  then  the Cao Y., Ogden J. P. and Tiu C. I.
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industry will tend to include bogus or “lemon” hedge funds whose managers claim that their strategy 
produces alpha when in fact they do not. Such managers are simply attempting to reap private benefits 
from assets under management (AUM) for as long as possible. To extend their operations over time, 
they will resort to biased reporting of returns by using internal pricing, realizing gains while delaying 
losses, etc.
The literature reviewed in Section 2 alludes to two mechanisms to mitigate these opacity problems. 
First, investors will make transparency demands, such as an external audit. However, a hedge fund 
then may resort to hiring a lax auditor, to bribing the auditor, etc. Alternatively, a monitoring mechanism 
could be employed. For instance, Stulz (2007) suggests that FOFs could serve as monitors of stand-
alone hedge funds. However, this argument presumes that the manager of the FOFs is not a benefitting 
participant in, or indeed the chief perpetrator of, a fraud.
3.1.2. Problem cluster 2: operational risks
Hedge funds face numerous risks that are inherent to their operations. First and foremost, hedge funds 
generally face liquidity risk, as they take positions in relatively illiquid securities, or positions in liquid 
securities that must be maintained for a considerable length of time. In turn, liquidity risk leads to 
funding  risks.  A  hedge  fund  is  financed  by  equity  investors  who  may  add  to  or  withdraw  their 
investments over time.  Hedge funds  respond to  the  liquidity  risk  posed by its  equity investors  by 
restricting investment and withdrawals, both initially and over time (i.e., in terms of lock-up period, 
redemption notice period, and redemption frequency). As we discuss later, the restrictions that a given 
hedge fund must impose depends critically on its investor clientele. A hedge fund’s prime broker, as its 
lender, can also expose the fund to funding risk, because the prime broker may later withdraw or modify 
their lines of credit, margin terms or short-sale terms. In turn, funding risk engenders adjacency risk. 
Because investors’ assets are co-mingled in a hedge fund, the decisions of some investors, particularly 
to either add or withdraw funds, may adversely affect the overall performance of the fund, especially if 
these actions disrupt the fund's trading strategy, causing either overinvestment or costly premature 
liquidations.
Of course, hedge funds’ use of leverage poses its own risks, especially the potential need for costly 
distressed liquidations. Leverage can be used on a contingent “line-of-credit” basis to inject capital that 
offsets redemptions by equity investors following poor performance. On the other hand, as Titman 
(2010) argues, hedge fund managers may have an incentive, due to the convexity of their contracts, to 
use leverage even if it is not in the investors’ interest.28
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Finally, we have concentration risk. If a hedge fund invests in only a few investments, or in only a few 
asset classes, sectors, or geographical areas, the fund will be more risky than if it was more diversified. 
FOFs and multi-strategy funds can alleviate this problem, the former by investing in stand-alone hedge 
funds that collectively are diversified, the latter by directly pursuing diversified strategies.
3.1.3. Problem cluster 3: alpha dilution risks
There are at least three ways in which a given hedge fund, pursuing a given strategy to generate alpha, 
can see their efforts thwarted. First, we have the issue of size. If the size of a hedge fund’s AUM 
becomes large relative to the size of the market in which it is operating, its own trades can move prices 
and destroy alpha at the margin. Alternatively, if multiple hedge funds are, even unwittingly, pursuing 
the same source of alpha, as their collective AUM grows the same result will occur. Second, and 
related, is the risk of mimicking. New mimicking hedge funds may develop based on the success of a 
given hedge fund’s strategy, especially if the initial hedge fund loses key personnel who then become 
competition for the same alpha. Third, because a hedge fund must use one or more prime brokers to 
execute trades, the executing broker may engage in front running of the hedge fund’s trades, which can 
substantially dilute the hedge fund’s ability to generate alpha.
3.2. Critiques of alternative hedge fund organizational structures
Next, we describe and critique several alternative organizational structures in the hedge fund industry in 
light of the fundamental problems discussed above. We facilitate our discussion by developing several 
stylized models of the organizational structures that have evolved in the industry in recent years (We 
admit that these models are simplifications of the hedge fund world, and are limited in scope to essential 
elements upon which we focus). The alternative structures vary in terms of the extent to which a given 
hedge fund is (a) tethered to a given investment bank and its “inside” investor clients, at one extreme, 
versus (b) funded by “outside” investors and/or a fund of funds, at the other extreme. Our discussion of 
these models highlights advantages and disadvantages of the alternative structures. In particular, we 
argue  that  opacity  and  conflict  of  interest  problems  vary  substantially  across  these  alternative 
structures, to the extent that some structures may be fundamentally flawed. Our critique leads to several 
hypotheses  about  cross-sectional  variation  in  stand-alone  hedge  fund  characteristics  (redemption 
restrictions, leverage, the use of 1 vs. multiple prime brokers, etc.) and performance, as well as a 
hypothesis about the boom-and-bust cycle that the industry exhibited during the decade of the 2000s.Cao Y., Ogden J. P. and Tiu C. I.
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3.2.1. The traditional investment bank model
The alternative hedge fund organizational structures that we will discuss are illustrated in Figures 2 to 6. 
However, we initially discuss a model of the traditional investment bank, illustrated in Figure 1. The 
traditional model is important for perspective, as “inside” hedge funds, defined later, directly supplant 
the traditional model. In the traditional model, the investment bank (the “House”) employs investment 
managers who make trades for the individual accounts of  “inside” or  “client” investors, as well as 
proprietary trades for the House account. The investment bank executes these trades in its role as the 
sole prime broker, receiving commissions directly from individual clients. Individual client investors also 
pay the House full fees (as distinguished from the reduced fees they pay in a hedge fund structure). 
Finally, the investment bank pays salaries and bonuses to investment managers.
FIGURE 1-TRADITIONAL INVESTMENT BANK MODEL
From the perspective of our analysis, the primary advantage of the traditional structure is the relatively 
stable bond that exists among (a) the House/prime broker, (b) the investment managers (i.e., trading 
talent), and (c) the individual investor clientele. In particular, the House serves as an effective monitor of 
investment managers on behalf of its clients because (a) it has inside information on the investment 
managers’ trading strategies and performance, and (b) it has an incentive to protect its reputational 
capital.  The  primary  disadvantages  of  the  traditional  structure  include:  (a)  Individual  investment 
managers are constrained in their trading strategies; (b) Investment managers’ incentives are curbed if 
bonuses are based on pooled performance; and (c) The House incurs substantial back office costs 
associated with the numerous individual trades with individual clients. These disadvantages, among 
others, may have spurred the development of “inside” hedge funds, to which we now turn.
3.2.2. The inside-only hedge fund model
Our initial hedge fund model is illustrated in Figure 2. We label the depicted structure as “inside-only”
because the focal hedge fund is open only to a given investment bank and its investor clientele. The 30
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inside-only hedge fund has the simplest hedge fund structure among those we discuss, and it is also the 
oldest (i.e., in the modern hedge fund era). Comparing the inside-only hedge fund model with the 
traditional investment bank model, we see that: (a) the general managers of the hedge fund(s) replace 
the cadre of investment managers; (b) clients, as well as the House, invest in the hedge fund(s) rather 
than in individual securities; and (c) the House, via its role as prime broker, collects commissions from 
the hedge fund rather than from individual clients. Moreover, the hedge fund’s general partners are paid 
directly from the hedge fund for their investment management services, so client investors pay only 
reduced fees to the House (rather than full fees in the traditional model, which include a component to 
pay salary and bonuses to investment managers). Finally, the House provides the hedge fund with a 
credit facility and risk management services.
FIGURE 2–INSIDE-ONLY HEDGE FUND MODEL
The advantages of the inside-only hedge fund structure are primarily that they mitigate disadvantages of 
the traditional structure noted earlier. First, the investment constraints faced by investment managers in 
the traditional structure are alleviated; the hedge fund’s general partners are relatively free to pursue 
specific investment strategies that may involve specific securities, short-selling, the use of leverage, etc. 
Second, the hedge fund’s general partners have a stronger incentive to perform than is the case for 
traditional investment managers because their pay is directly tied to the performance of the hedge fund 
that they control. Third, the House’s back office costs are substantially reduced because individual 
clients invest in the hedge fund rather than numerous individual securities. The inside-only hedge fund 
structure should be able to capture these advantages without substantial loss of the “trust” advantage of 
the traditional structure. After all, the House can (a) control the amount of client (and House) capital that 
is invested in each of its inside hedge funds, and (b) effectively monitor the trading strategies and 
performance of its inside hedge funds. Moreover, the House has two strong incentives to monitor the 
performance of its inside hedge funds: (a) It still collects (albeit reduced) fees from its investor clientele; 
and (b) It stands to benefit from its own (i.e., proprietary) investment in the hedge funds. The inside 
hedge fund model also avoids all of the fundamental problems discussed earlier. Overall, we conclude Cao Y., Ogden J. P. and Tiu C. I.
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that the inside-only hedge fund structure dominates the traditional investment bank structure. As we will 
see below, the inside-only hedge fund structure also appears to dominate other hedge fund structures.
3.2.3. The straddling hedge fund model
The second hedge fund structure is illustrated in Figure 3. We call this the “straddling” hedge fund 
model because, while the hedge fund remains strongly tethered to a single investment bank (especially 
its prime brokerage and investor clientele), it is also open to outside investors. A potential advantage of 
this structure over the “inside-only” structure is that each hedge fund has the opportunity to be larger, 
and thus better able to capture economies of scale, than if its size is restricted to include only the 
“inside” capital (i.e., clientele and House capital) allocated by the House. The hedge fund’s general 
partners would be particularly keen to pursue this opportunity because both their base fee and profit 
share increase with fund size.
FIGURE 3–STRADDLING HEDGE FUND MODEL
However, several fundamental problems attend the straddling hedge fund structure do not exist within 
inside-only hedge fund structure. These include transparency demands, funding risk, adjacency risk, 
and  size.  Regarding  size,  we  stated  above  that  increasing  the  size  of  a  hedge  fund  can  be  an 
advantage due to economies of scale and increased incentive compensation for investment managers. 
However, if the fund grows too large for the market being exploited, alpha will be diluted. Of course, 
hedge fund can close to new investors to avoid this threat to its strategic mandate. Nevertheless, the 
adjacency problem emerges with new outside investors because, unlike the investment bank’s inside 
investor clientele, outside investors have no bond of trust with the investment bank or its hedge funds. 
Thus,  if  outside investors  withdraw  substantial  funds, other  investors,  including and especially  the 
investment bank’s inside investor clientele, stand to lose, which would compromise the bond of trust 32
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with  the  investment  bank.  A  straddling  hedge  fund  can  reduce  the  expected  costs  of  un-orderly 
liquidations by having a longer lock-up period and more restrictive redemption terms, but these would 
also be imposed on inside clients, which was unnecessary in the “inside-only” hedge fund structure. 
Allowing outside investors into a hedge fund also engenders a transparency demands problem. Outside 
investors  will  demand  information  about  the  fund’s  investment  strategy.  Indeed,  many  institutional 
investors are barred from making investments where due diligence is inadequate. This may pose a 
dilemma because a hedge fund’s investment strategy is proprietary, and its revelation in any detail 
would jeopardize its value. This problem may not be severe in the case of a straddling hedge fund 
because it can lean on its tether to the House’s reputation; hence the term “brand hedge fund” in 
industry lexicon. However, as we discuss later the transparency dilemma may be a serious problem for 
“outside”hedge funds.
3.2.4. The straddling “feeder” fund of funds model
One means by which an investment bank can manage both investments into and withdrawals from its 
“opened” hedge funds by outside investors is to create a straddling “feeder” fund of funds as depicted in 
Figure 4. Outside investors invest in and withdraw from the FOF, and the FOF’s general partners, 
working in conjunction with the House, allocate new outside capital to hedge funds that can profitably 
invest  it,  and  allocate  withdrawals  to  hedge  funds  that  are  most  amenable  to  withdrawals.  This 
investment-and-withdrawal allocation motive for developing a FOF complements the motives suggested 
by Stulz (2007) and noted earlier: monitoring, diversification, risk management, and due diligence efficacy.
FIGURE 4–STRADDLING “FEEDER” FUND OF FUNDS MODELCao Y., Ogden J. P. and Tiu C. I.
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The investment bank can make further use of its FOF to reduce adjacency risk for its client investors by 
allocating some of the outside capital to additional “outside” hedge funds. These additional “relief valve”
hedge funds can be employed to mitigate adverse effects of either excess capital inflows or withdrawals 
by outsiders on the inside hedge funds in which clients are directly invested. Of course, the outside 
hedge funds may be inferior to inside hedge funds, in which case the performance of the FOF will be 
inferior to the performance of the investment bank’s inside hedge funds, even before the FOFs general 
partners take their cut. Thus, our straddling “feeder” FOF model suggests one reason why evidence 
(Agarwal  and  Kale  (2007);  Fung,  Hsieh,  Naik,  and  Ramadorai  (2008))  has  shown  that  FOFs 
underperform stand-alone hedge funds even on a gross-of-fees basis: “Relief-valve” hedge funds may 
be lemons.
3.2.5. The stand-alone outside hedge fund model
Figure 5 depicts a model for a simple stand-alone outside hedge fund. The outside hedge fund exhibits 
all of the fundamental problems that we have discussed. An outside hedge fund is likely to exhibit a 
greater lemons problem than the inside hedge funds discussed earlier because they are not formally 
tethered to an investment bank and its reputational capital. Thus, potential investors will make more 
transparency demands. Funding and adjacency risks are also likely to be high for an outside hedge 
fund. Size issues and mimicking may be a greater problem for outside hedge funds, as well.
FIGURE 5–OUTSIDE HEDGE FUND MODEL
Finally, outside hedge funds are exposed to greater front running risk. In the figure, we depict the 
outside hedge fund as having two prime brokers, as this may be necessary to limit front running.
3.2.6. The outside “feeder” fund of funds model
The final hedge fund organizational structure that we discuss, which we call the outside “feeder” fund of 
funds model, is depicted in Figure 6. Investors invest in the FOF, which in turn invests in a variety of 
“tethered” outside hedge funds. This arrangement has two potential advantages over the stand-alone 
outside hedge fund model. First, the outside FOF managers can efficiently screen “winner” outside 34
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hedge funds, and monitor those selected, on behalf of investors. Second, the arrangement may serve to 
stabilize the flow of funds into and out of each hedge fund, thus alleviating both funding and adjacency 
risks for each of the outside hedge funds relative to what they would face on a stand-alone basis. This 
structure  provides  additional  advantages  in  terms  of  reducing  concentration  risk  and  capturing 
economies of scale in terms of due diligence, risk management, and back office duties.
FIGURE 6–OUTSIDE “FEEDER” FUND OF FUNDS MODEL
However, the outside “feeder” FOF structure is also replete with problems. First, adjacency risk may be 
substantial despite the moderating effect of a FOF because the investor base does not include a cadre 
of stable “inside” investors. For this reason, we predict that an outside FOF may actually be forced to 
offer relatively poor liquidity for outside investors (i.e., in terms of lock-up period, redemption notice 
period, and redemption frequency). Second, the general managers of both the outside FOF and the 
outside hedge funds in which it invests may have relatively small amount of reputational capital at stake, 
which can lead to a situation in which many of the outside hedge funds in the structure may be lemons. 
Third and finally, the bond between each hedge fund and the prime broker(s) it uses is much weaker 
than for “inside” hedge funds. Consequently, the stand-alone hedge funds in this structure may still 
need to employ multiple prime brokers to mitigate front running risk.
4. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we investigate the role of funds of funds for investors as well as for the hedge fund 
industry. We find that fund of funds do not generate excess performance on top of that investors can 
achieve, and do not offer better liquidity terms than the average hedge fund. On the other hand, we find Cao Y., Ogden J. P. and Tiu C. I.
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that hedge funds facilitate flows into funds and access to capital in general without however improving 
the funds’ performance. This suggests that fund of funds would be more appropriate in their role as 
advisors to investors, than in their role of information facilitators or portfolio managers.
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